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<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nFischer wasn\u2019t there in his official capacity as a police officer with the North Cornwall Township Police Department in Pennsylvania. He was there to, per text messages he sent that were later cited in a filing by Department of Justice lawyers <\/a>, \u201ctake democratic congress to the gallows.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cCan\u2019t vote if they can\u2019t breathe..lol,\u201d Fischer allegedly wrote in another text message about his plans before Jan. 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fischer, per federal charging documents <\/a>, <\/strong>pushed his way into the building with yells of \u201cCharge!\u201d Once inside, he crashed into a line of police officers, according to a cell phone video he recorded. Fischer and at least one police officer were knocked to the ground. Police removed him four minutes later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Later identified by one of his coworkers, Fischer was arrested by federal officers on Feb. 19, 2021. He was charged with multiple felonies, but has still yet to go to trial. That\u2019s because he\u2019s appealed one of his charges all the way to the Supreme Court, which will hear arguments on April 16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At issue is a law that makes it a felony if someone \u201ccorruptly \u2026 obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.\u201d This law \u2014 known as 18 U.S.C. 1512(c) \u2014 was enacted as part of the accounting reform law passed in 2002, in the wake of the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals <\/a>. Federal prosecutors have used it to charge 330 people who were involved in the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, including Fischer \u2014 and former President Donald Trump.<\/p>\n\n\n Fischer argues in his appeal that the provision was not intended to be used in this way. Instead, he claims, a full reading of the law\u2019s text shows that it was only meant to apply to the corrupt obstruction or impediment of documents in an official proceeding. This view revolves around the word \u201cotherwise\u201d in the provision, which reads (emphasis added):<\/p>\n\n\n\n (c) Whoever corruptly\u2014<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object\u2019s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n (2) otherwise <\/strong>obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The main points of contention that emerged in lower courts were how the word \u201cotherwise\u201d should be defined, and how it connects the first subsection to the second.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourteen district court judges have upheld charges for obstructing an official proceeding in Jan. 6 insurrection-related cases, on the understanding that \u201cotherwise\u201d means \u201cin a different manner.\u201d This would mean that the language of the first subsection related to the destruction of documents holds no bearing on the second subsection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But in an appeal to dismiss the same charge when it was brought against Jan. 6 defendant Garret Miller, D.C. District Judge Carl Nichols reached a different conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In his March 2022 decision <\/a>, Nichols wrote that the word \u201cotherwise\u201d imposes a limit on the second subsection, and \u201crequires that the defendant have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object in order to corruptly obstruct, impede or influence an official proceeding.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since Miller did not attempt to obstruct an official proceeding related to a document, Nichols wrote, that charge against him was dismissed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nichols referred to his decision in Miller\u2019s case to similarly dismiss the charge against Fischer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On appeal, a majority from a panel for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals <\/a>disagreed. That ruling determined that the word \u201cotherwise\u201d should instead be defined by the \u201cthe commonplace, dictionary meaning\u201d as \u201cin a different manner\u201d and, therefore, the \u201cobstruction\u201d prohibited by law does not refer solely to document-related crimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subsection Fischer was charged under \u201capplies to all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than the conduct that is already covered by\u201d the first subsection, Judge Florence Pan wrote in an opinion joined in part by Judge Justin Walker.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The appeals court panel, however, was not in full agreement. Judge Gregory Katsas dissented, siding with Nichols\u2019 interpretation that \u201cotherwise\u201d meant \u201cin a manner similar to.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Katsas\u2019 argument leans on prior court precedent set in the 2015 case Yates v. U.S. <\/a>, which found the definitions of words in legal language should not be interpreted in such a broad manner as to depart from the underlying purpose of the law in question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/lakelandgazette.info\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2e7cff1b1bc8ad6ae635c312ff641e03.jpeg\")
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